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PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 1991 (NO. 103 OF 1991) - SECT 61

When restraining order ceases to be in force

61. (1) If, at the end of the period of 48 hours after the making of a restraining order in reliance on the proposed charging of a person with an offence, the person has not been charged with the offence or a related indictable offence, the order ceases to be in force at the end of that period.

(2) Subject to subsection (5), where—

        (a)     a restraining order is made in reliance on a person's conviction of an offence or the charging of a person with an offence; or

        (b)     a restraining order is made in reliance on the proposed charging of a person with an offence and the person is, within the succeeding period of 48 hours, charged with the offence or a related indictable offence;

the following provisions have effect:

        (c)     if, within the relevant period in relation to the restraining order, the charge is withdrawn and the person is not charged with a related indictable offence by the time the charge is withdrawn, the restraining order ceases to be in force when the charge is withdrawn;

        (d)     if, within the relevant period in relation to the restraining order, the person is acquitted of the charge and the person is not charged with a related indictable offence by the time of the acquittal, the restraining order ceases to be in force when the acquittal occurs;

        (e)     if—

              (i)     the Supreme Court makes a confiscation order that is a pecuniary penalty order in reliance on the person's conviction of the offence or a related indictable offence;

              (ii)     the pecuniary penalty order is satisfied or otherwise ceases to be in force; and

              (iii)     when the order is satisfied or otherwise ceases to be in force—

(A)     no application for another confiscation order made in reliance on the person's conviction of the offence or a related indictable offence is yet to be determined; and

(B)     no other confiscation order made in reliance on the person's conviction of the offence or a related indictable offence is in force;

the restraining order ceases to be in force, upon the pecuniary penalty order being satisfied or otherwise ceasing to be in force, to the extent that the property to which the restraining order relates is the same as the property that is sold or otherwise disposed of to satisfy the pecuniary penalty order and pay the costs, charges, expenses and remuneration referred to in subsection 53 (6);

        (f)     if—

              (i)     the Supreme Court refuses an application for a confiscation order in reliance on the person's conviction of the offence or a related indictable offence; and

              (ii)     when the Court refuses the application—

(A)     no application for another confiscation order made in reliance on the person's conviction of the offence or a related indictable offence is yet to be determined; and

(B)     no other confiscation order made in reliance on the person's conviction of the offence or a related indictable offence is in force;

the restraining order ceases to be in force when the Court refuses the application;

        (g)     if some or all of the property subject to the restraining order is forfeited under section 19 or 28, the restraining order, to the extent to which it relates to that property, ceases to be in force when that property is forfeited;

        (h)     if, within the relevant period in relation to the restraining order, an application is made to the Court under subsection (3) for an extension of the period of operation of the restraining order and the Court refuses the application after the end of the relevant period, the restraining order ceases to be in force when the Court refuses the application;

              (i)     subject to paragraph (h) if, within the relevant period in relation to the restraining order, an application is made to the Court under subsection (3) for an extension of the period of operation of the restraining order and that application is granted, the restraining order ceases to be in force at such time, or on the occurrence of such event, as is specified in an order of the Court made under that subsection;

        (j)     in any other case, the restraining order ceases to be in force at the end of the relevant period in relation to the restraining order.

(3) The DPP may, before the end of the relevant period in relation to a restraining order against property made in reliance on a person's conviction of an offence or the charging, or proposed charging, of a person with an offence, apply to the Supreme Court that made the restraining order for an extension of the period of operation of the restraining order and, if the Court is satisfied—

        (a)     that a forfeiture order may still be made in respect of the property or part of the property;

        (b)     that the property or part of the property may still become forfeited under subsection 28 (1); or

        (c)     where the property is—

              (i)     property of the person; or

              (ii)     property of another person—

(A)     against which the restraining order was made by virtue of subparagraph 46 (7) (a) (ii) or (8) (a) (ii); or

(B)     in relation to which an order under subsection 27 (2) has been, or is likely to be, made;

that a pecuniary penalty order may still be made against the person;

the Court may—

        (d)     by order, extend the period of operation of the restraining order; and

        (e)     make such other order or orders as it considers appropriate in relation to the operation of the restraining order.

(4) The DPP shall give a person written notice of an application under subsection (3) in relation to a restraining order in respect of property of the person.

(5) Where—

        (a)     a restraining order has been made in reliance on a person's conviction of an offence or the charging, or proposed charging, of a person with an offence; and

        (b)     in reliance on the person's conviction of the offence or a related indictable offence, the Supreme Court has made a forfeiture order in respect of part or all of the property and has also made a pecuniary penalty order against the person;

the Court may make such further orders, and give such directions, as it considers appropriate in relation to the operation of the restraining order, the forfeiture order and the pecuniary penalty order, and this Act has effect, in relation to those orders and to the property subject to those orders, subject to any further orders, or any directions, so given.

(6) A reference in this section to the relevant period in relation to a restraining order is a reference to the period beginning on the day when the order was made and ending—

        (a)     if an order has, or orders have, been made under subsection (3) extending the restraining order's period of operation—at such time, or on the occurrence of such event, as is specified in the order, or the last of the orders, so made;

        (b)     if paragraph (a) does not apply but an order has, or orders have, been made by virtue of paragraph 51 (1) (a), (b) or (f) in relation to the restraining order—at the end of 6 months after the day when the order, or the last of the orders, was so made; or

        (c)     in any other case—at the end of 6 months after the day when the restraining order was made.

(7) In this section—

“extend” includes further extend.



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