22—Conduct falling outside the ambit of this Division
(1) This Division does
not apply to the conduct of a person who causes harm to another if the victim
lawfully consented to the act causing the harm.
(2) A lawful consent
given on behalf of a person who is not of full age and capacity by a parent or
guardian will be taken to be the consent of the person for whom the consent
was given.
(3) A person may
consent to harm (including serious harm) if the nature of the harm and the
purpose for which it is inflicted fall within limits that are generally
accepted in the community.
Examples—
1 A person may (within the limits referred to
above) consent to harm that has a religious purpose (eg male circumcision but
not female genital mutilation).
2 A person may (within the limits referred to
above) consent to harm that has a genuine therapeutic purpose (eg a person
with 2 healthy kidneys may consent to donate 1 for the purpose of
transplantation to someone with kidney disease).
3 A person may (within the limits referred to
above) consent to harm for the purpose of controlling fertility (eg a
vasectomy or tubal ligation).
4 A participant in a sporting or recreational
activity may (within the limits referred to above) consent to harm arising
from a risk inherent in the nature of the activity (eg a boxer may accept the
risk of being knocked unconscious in the course of a boxing match and, hence,
consent to that harm if it in fact ensues).
(4) If a defendant's
conduct lies within the limits of what would be generally accepted in the
community as normal incidents of social interaction or community life, this
Division does not apply to the conduct unless it is established that the
defendant intended to cause harm.
(5) If the defendant's
conduct caused only mental harm, this Division does not apply to the
defendant's conduct unless—
(a) the
defendant's conduct gave rise to a situation in which the victim's life or
physical safety was endangered and the mental harm arose out of that
situation; or
(b) the
defendant's primary purpose was to cause such harm.
Examples—
1 An examiner fails a student in an examination
knowing that the student has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and that
failure to pass is likely to precipitate a schizophrenic episode. The student
in fact suffers such an episode.
2 An employer legally terminates an employee's
employment knowing that the employee suffers from a mental illness and that
the termination is likely to exacerbate the mental illness. The employee in
fact suffers an exacerbation of the mental illness.
In both the above examples, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to prove
that the defendant acted intentionally knowing that harm would inevitably,
probably or possibly result from his or her act. It would be necessary for the
prosecution to establish that the defendant wanted to cause harm and that
desire was the sole or a significant motivation for the defendant's conduct.