(1)  If it appears to the Court that an appellant, though not properly convicted on some count or part of the indictment has been properly convicted on some other count or part of the indictment, the Court may either affirm the sentence passed at the trial or pass such sentence, whether more or less severe, in substitution therefor, as it thinks proper, and as may be warranted in law by the conviction on the indictment or part thereof on which it considers the appellant has been properly convicted.

(2)  Where an appellant has been convicted of a crime, and the jury could on the indictment have found him guilty of some other crime, and on the finding of the jury it appears to the Court that the jury must have been satisfied of facts which proved him guilty of that other crime, the Court may, instead of allowing or dismissing the appeal, substitute for the verdict found by the jury a verdict of guilty of that other crime, and pass such sentence, not being a sentence of greater severity, in substitution for the sentence passed at the trial, as may be warranted in law for that other crime.

(3)  Where, on the conviction of the appellant, the jury have found a special verdict, and the Court considers that a wrong conclusion has been arrived at by the court of trial on the effect of that verdict, the Court may, instead of allowing the appeal, order such conclusion to be recorded as appears to the Court to be in law required by the verdict, and pass such sentence, whether more or less severe, in substitution for the sentence passed at the trial, as may be warranted in law.

(3A)  Where under the foregoing provisions of this section the Court has power to affirm, or to pass a sentence in substitution for, a sentence passed on a person at his trial it may, instead of exercising that power, refer the case to the trial judge, and, on the case being so referred to him, that judge may himself exercise that power as if he were the Court; and any power exercised by a judge under this section has the like effect as if it were exercised by the Court.

(4)  If on any appeal it appears to the Court that, although the appellant committed the act or made the omission charged against him, he was not of sound mind at the time when the act or omission alleged to constitute the crime occurred, so as not to be responsible therefor according to law, the Court may quash the sentence passed at the trial and exercise the like powers as could have been exercised if the appellant had been acquitted on the ground of insanity.